Buffalo Law Review
Volume 54

Number 4

Article 6

1-1-2007

Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty
through a Continuum of Due Process Rights
Michelle A. Daubert
University at Buffalo School of Law (Student)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Michelle A. Daubert, Pandemic Fears and Contemporary Quarantine: Protecting Liberty through a
Continuum of Due Process Rights, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1299 (2007).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol54/iss4/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

COMMENT

Pandemic Fears and Contemporary
Quarantine: Protecting Liberty Through a
Continuum of Due Process Rights
MICHELLE

A. DAUBERTt

[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute
right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which
every person is necessarily subject for the common good. 1
INTRODUCTION

Isolation and quarantine are historically recognized
public health tools used to contain the spread of infectious
diseases. Both isolation and quarantine severely curtail the
freedom of individuals to whom they are applied. Thus, they
are often tools of last resort because they require the
separation of infected and potentially infected persons from
the public through confinement to treatment facilities,
residences, and other locations.

t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo, 2007; B.S., Cornell
University, 2004. I would like to thank Professor Sheila R. Shulman for her
guidance and thoughtful comments on preliminary drafts, and the members of
the Buffalo Law Review for their editorial assistance. I also wish to thank my
family and Steven Finckbeiner for their support and encouragement.
1. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
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Contemporary concerns regarding an avian flu
pandemic and threats of bioterrorism make it reasonable to
anticipate the imposition of large numbers of quarantine
orders should public health officials find themselves
confronted with threats of uncertain origin, magnitude, and
risk. 2 Given the obvious liberty interests implicated when
individuals are involuntarily confined, sufficient due
process in quarantine regulations is imperative. This
Comment addresses the ways in which traditional elements
of procedural due process would come into play in a
contemporary quarantine and how individuals affected by
quarantine orders would exercise their due process rights.
The implications of substantive due process concerns are
considered to a lesser extent as well. Such an analysis is
important because the United States has not implemented
quarantine measures on a large scale since the Spanish flu
pandemic in 1918-1919, 3 well before the expansion of due
process in the 1960s and 1970s.

2. It is feared that it is only a matter of time before the avian flu H5N1 virus
mutates into a form that passes easily among people, triggering a pandemic.
Predictions estimate that a modern pandemic could lead to the deaths of
200,000 to 2 million people in the United States alone. 1 HOMELAND SEC.
COUNCIL, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR PANDEMIC

INFLUENZA (May 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/
pandemic-influenza-implementation.html [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
On May 3, 2006, President George W. Bush released the Implementation Plan,
a follow-up to his National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza issued on
November 1, 2005. See id.; HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
PANDEMIC

INFLUENZA

(Nov.

2005),

available at

www.whitehouse.gov/

homeland/nspi.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. The Implementation Plan
discusses the avian flu pandemic threat and translates the National Strategy
for Pandemic Influenza into more than 300 actions for Federal departments and
agencies and "sets clear expectations for State and local governments and other
non-Federal entities." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, FACT
SHEET: ADVANCING THE NATION'S PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC INFLUENZA (May

3, 2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060503-5.html.
According to the Implementation Plan, "[t]he response to an influenza pandemic
could require, if necessary and appropriate, measures such as isolation or
quarantine." IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra, at 12. See also 2 DEP'T HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., PANDEMIC PLANNING UPDATE II: A REPORT FROM SEC'Y MICHAEL
0. LEAVITT (June 29, 2006) ("[W]e are in a race, a race against a fast-moving,
highly pathogenic avian H5N1 flu virus; a race to prepare in every possible way

against a potential human flu pandemic.").
3. American Red Cross, Controlling the Spread of Contagious Diseases:
Quarantine and Isolation, http://www.redcross.org/preparedness/cdc english/
IsoQuar.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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Part I of this Comment examines the history of
quarantine abroad and in the United States, and reviews
state and federal authority to impose quarantine
requirements. Part II discusses the importance of legal
limits on quarantine authority, such as substantive and
procedural due process protections, the appropriate
parameters of procedural due process, and the legal origins
of applying procedural due process requirements to
quarantine of communicable diseases. It also discusses why,
in the event a large-scale quarantine is imposed in the
United States, viewing procedural and substantive due
process from a continuum framework will provide the
necessary flexibility for public health officials and the court
system to adapt to unexpected situations. The focus of Part
III is on current quarantine procedural due process
requirements at the state and federal level, including those
incorporated into amendments of federal quarantine law
proposed by the Centers for Disease Control in November of
2005. 4 Part IV will conclude with specific ways due process
guarantees can be protected in the event of a large-scale
quarantine.
I.

QUARANTINE FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO MODERN DAY

A. HistoricalOrigins of Quarantine
For centuries, isolation and quarantine have proven
effective in controlling the spread of infectious diseases by
increasing social distance between healthy individuals and
those who are infected or have been exposed. Although the
term quarantine is commonly used to refer to both isolation
and quarantine, the two strategies differ. Isolation is
defined as "the separation of persons who have a specific
infectious illness from those who are healthy and the
restriction of their movement to stop the spread of that
illness."5 Quarantine, on the other hand, is defined as "the
separation and restriction of movement of persons who,
4. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed
Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70-71).
5. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FACT SHEET ON ISOLATION

QUARANTINE
(May
isolationquarantine.htm.

AND

3,

2005),

http://www.cdc.gov/nciDOD/sars/
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while not yet ill, have been exposed '6to an infectious agent
and therefore may become infectious.
The concept of using isolation and quarantine for the
purpose of controlling the spread of disease goes as far back
as the Old Testament. The idea that unclean persons
should be isolated from the rest of the community can be
found in the Book of Leviticus. 7 In the early Middle Ages,
the Church drew upon such biblical references as the basis
of their methods for combating leprosy. 8 During the Council
of Lyons held in 538 A.D., the Church issued a decree that
restricted the free association of lepers with healthy
persons. 9 A leper was considered a public menace and was
expelled from the community to protect its healthy
members. 10 Due process protections had yet to be
articulated; thus, a person with leprosy was deprived of all
civic rights and was considered socially dead, given the
incurable nature of the disease. 1
This early form of preventive medicine was adopted and
expanded upon in dealing with the bubonic plague during
the Middle Ages. In the fourteenth century the bubonic
plague, or "Black Death," spread rapidly throughout
Europe. 12 Communities took measures not only to control
disease specifically within the community, but also to
prevent its entry. 13 All suspected individuals and objects
were isolated and observed for a specified period under
stringent conditions until it was determined that they were
not bearers of the plague. 14 The most significant early

6. Id.
7. See Leviticus 13:46 (King James) ("All the days wherein the plague shall
be in him he shall be defiled; he is unclean: he shall dwell alone; without the
camp shall his habitation be."); GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 64
(1958); CHARLES-EDWARD AMORY WINSLOW, THE CONQUEST OF EPIDEMIC
DISEASE: A CHAPTER IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 78-80 (Hafner Publ'g Co. 1967)
(1943) (explaining additional biblical examples of quarantine regulation).
8. See ROSEN, supranote 7, at 64.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 64-65.
12. See id. at 66.
13. See id. at 67.
14. Id. at 67-68.
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attempt to protect a population and its commercial
enterprise against plague occurred in Venice, which by 1348
had systematic procedures to deal with infected ships,
travelers, and merchandise. 15 In 1377, the Republic of
Regusa, on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, implemented
regulations that had proven successful in Venice. 16 A thirtyday period of isolation, termed the "trentina," for ships
17
coming from plague-stricken areas was routinely ordered.
This period was later extended to forty days, the
"quarantina," which gave rise to the more modern term
"quarantine."18
Quarantine in American history dates back to the time
of the American Colonies. Colonists brought with them from
Europe their knowledge of and experience with isolation
and quarantine, knowing them to be effective methods of
preventing the spread of disease. 19 Quarantine in the
colonies was first directed toward disease which entered by
sea; the concept of local isolation and quarantine developed
later. 20 The statutory authority for the imposition of
quarantine originated during the colonial period at the local
level. 2 1
The earliest formal quarantine restriction in America
was a maritime quarantine enacted by the Massachusetts
Bay Colony in 1647 against Barbados. 22 By 1797,
Massachusetts established quarantine powers in the first
comprehensive
state
public
health
statute. 23
At
approximately the same time, in 1796, a yellow fever
15. See RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE: 1798-1950, at 63 (1951); see ROSEN, supra note 7, at 68; WESLEY W.
SPINK, INFECTIOUS DISEASES: PREVENTION AND TREATMENT IN THE NINETEENTH
AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES 7 (1978).
16. See ROSEN, supra note 7, at 68-69; WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 63.
17. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 63-65.

18. Id. at 65.
19. Leah Hammett, Comment, Protecting Children with AIDS Against
ArbitraryExclusion from School, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1373, 1377 (1986).
20. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 66.

21. Joseph Barbera et al., Large-Scale Quarantine Following Biological
Terrorism in the United States: Scientific Examination, Logistic and Legal

Limits, and Possible Consequences, 286 JAMA 2711, 2712 (2001).
22. WILLIAMS, supra note 15, at 65.
23. Barbera et al., supra note 21, at 2712.
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epidemic prompted Congress to pass the first federal
quarantine statute authorizing the President to assist in
state quarantines. 24 As the federal government became
more active in regulating the practice of quarantine, a
nineteenth century conflict arose between federal and state
quarantine powers. 25 In the ensuing federalism debate, the
states claimed authority pursuant to their police power; the
federal government maintained it had preeminent
26
authority deriving from its interstate commerce powers.
B. State QuarantineAuthority
Currently, each state has the authority to compel
isolation and quarantine within its borders pursuant to its
inherent "police powers."27 The state police powers were
first referred to in Gibbons v. Ogden.28 In Gibbons, the
United States Supreme Court recognized the state's power
to protect the health of its citizens, including the imposition
of quarantine measures. 29 Chief Justice John Marshall
conceived of state police powers as:
[T]hat immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing
within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general
government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by
the States themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health
laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the
internal commerce of a State .... 30

In Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v.
Louisiana State Board of Health, the Supreme Court
reiterated the state's authority to enact and enforce laws
"for the purpose of preventing, eradicating, or controlling

24. Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474 (repealed 1799); see WILLIAMS,
supra note 15, at 68.
25. See Barbera et al., supra note 21, at 2712.
26. See id.; Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 377-88 (1902); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 205-06
(9 Wheat) (1824).
27. See generally Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.

28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 203 (emphasis added).
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the spread of contagious or infectious diseases." 31 At issue
in Compagnie was a resolution passed by the Louisiana
Board of Health preventing anyone from entering a place in
Louisiana where a quarantine had been declared. 32 A
French cargo ship, although free from any infectious or
contagious disease, was not permitted to enter New
Orleans. 33 The Court upheld state authority to enact and
enforce the quarantine, despite its impact on interstate
commerce. 34 "That from an early day the power of the states
to enact and enforce quarantine laws for the safety and the
protection of the health of their inhabitants has been
recognized by Congress, is beyond question." 35 The Court
recognized an exception to state quarantine authority,
however, where state law conflicts with federal36law passed
by Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
[W]henever Congress shall undertake to provide . . . a general
system of quarantine, or shall confide the execution of the details
of such a system to a national board of health, or to local boards,
as may be found expedient, all state laws on the subject will be
abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent. But, until
37
this is done, the laws of the state on the subject are valid.

Three years after Compagnie, the Supreme Court ruled
on the seminal case of Jacobson v. Massachusetts.38 In
Jacobson, the Court upheld a state's authority to enact laws
mandating compulsory vaccination. 39 Although the case
involved mandatory vaccination against smallpox, rather
than a quarantine, it provides the leading authority for
states to enact quarantine laws. Justice John Marshall
Harlan, writing for the Court, remarked, "[u]pon the

31. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur, 186 U.S. at 387
(upholding the quarantine law at issue and its implementation as an
appropriate exercise of state police power).
32. See id. at 381-82.
33. See id. at 381.
34. See id. at 397.
35. Id. at 387.
36. See id. at 388.

37. Id.
38. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
39. See id. at 37-38.
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principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a
community has the right to protect itself against an
epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its
members." 40 For over 100 years, the Jacobson opinion has
served as the constitutional foundation for state41 actions
that constrain liberty in the name of public health.
C. Federal QuarantineAuthority
Notwithstanding the status of quarantine as a public
health measure generally within the states' purview, the
federal government has the authority to enact quarantine
measures to prevent the transmission of communicable
diseases across state lines and to prevent the introduction
of infectious diseases from foreign countries into the United
States. Federal law provides two basic authorities for
exercising quarantine power in the event of an outbreak of
communicable disease: (1) general provisions of42Title 42 of
the United States Code; and (2) the Stafford Act.
1. Title 42 of the United States Code. Federal law
authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services
("Secretary of HHS") peacetime 43 and wartime 44 authority
to control the movement of individuals into and within the
United States to prevent the spread of communicable
disease. 45 Under its delegated authority, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention ("CDC"), through the
Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, is empowered
to detain, medically examine, or conditionally release
individuals reasonably believed to be carrying a
communicable disease.

40. Id. at 27.
41. See generally Wendy E. Parmet et al., Individual Rights versus the
Public's Health -

100 Years after Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 352 NEw ENG. J.

MED. 652 (2005).
42.
U.S.C.
43.
44.

See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
§§ 5121-5206 (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. § 266 (2000).

45. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 267-268, 270 (2000) (describing methods by which
the movement of individuals may be controlled in order to prevent the spread of
communicable disease).
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The list of diseases for which quarantine is authorized
is specified in an Executive Order by the President on the
recommendation of the Secretary of HHS. 46 Since 1983, the
list has
included
cholera,
diphtheria,
infectious
tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and viral
hemorrhagic fevers; 47 severe acute respiratory syndrome
("SARS") was added by Executive Order in April, 2003.48
President George W. Bush recognized the very real threat
of an avian flu pandemic and signed an Executive Order on
April 1, 2005 to amend the list by adding types of influenza
that either
cause or have the potential to cause a
49
pandemic.
The exercise of federal authority to quarantine an
exposed person was challenged in United States v.
Shinnick.50 The U.S. Public Health Service had
quarantined for fourteen days an airline passenger arriving
from Stockholm, Sweden, which had been declared a small
pox infected area by the World Health Organization. 51 On
arrival, the passenger failed to present valid certification of
smallpox vaccination. 52 The district court upheld the
detention, finding that the federal health authorities acted
in good faith, given the opportunity for exposure while the
passenger had been in Stockholm.5 3 Further, there was no
way of determining whether she had been infected until the
incubation period of fourteen days had54expired; she also had
a history of unsuccessful vaccinations.

46. See 42 U.S.C. § 264(b) (2000).
47. Exec. Order No. 12,452, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1983) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
13,295).
48. Exec. Order No, 13,295, 3 C.F.R. 220 (2003) (amended by Exec. Order
No. 13,375).
49. Exec. Order No. 13,375, 3 C.F.R. 162 (2005) ("Influenza caused by novel
or reemergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause,
a pandemic.").
50. United States v. Shinnick, 219 F.Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
51. See id. at 790.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 791.
54. See id.
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2. Stafford Act. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief
and Emergency Assistance Act ("Stafford Act") 55 provides
another avenue through which the federal government has
authority to implement quarantine. It was enacted to
provide support and assistance to state and local
governments when disaster overwhelms them. 56 The
Stafford Act establishes a process for requesting and
obtaining a Presidential disaster declaration by the
governor of the affected state; 57 defines the type and scope
of assistance available from the federal government; and,
puts forth the conditions for obtaining that assistance. 58 In
any major disaster, the president may implement health
59
and safety measures, presumably including quarantine.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA"),
now part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security,
coordinates the response. Quarantine would then be
implemented under the statutory standards in Title 42 of
the United States Code.
D. Federal-StateCooperation
The government's slow response following Hurricane
Katrina and the resulting devastation of the U.S. Gulf
Coast
highlights
the
importance
of
emergency

55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2000).
56. See 42 U.S.C.
MANAGEMENT AGENCY,

§

A

5121 (2000); see generally FEDERAL EMERGENCY
GUIDE TO THE DISASTER DECLARATION PROCESS AND

FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE (2004), available at http://www.fema.gov/pdfl
rebuildlrecover/dec_proc.pdf.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170 ("All requests for a declaration by the President
that a major disaster exists shall be made by the Governor of the affected State.
Such a request shall be based on a finding that the disaster is of such severity
and magnitude that effective response is beyond the capabilities of the State
and the affected local governments and that Federal assistance is necessary.").
58. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206; See also FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY, supra note 56.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(3)(D); JASON W. SAPSIN, CTR. FOR LAW AND THE
PUB.'S HEALTH AT GEORGETOWN AND JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVS., OVERVIEW OF
FEDERAL AND STATE QUARANTINE AUTHORITY
4 (2002), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ResourcesPDFs/2propietary.pdf.
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preparedness.6 0 Moreover, this recent tragic event
illustrates that an efficient interplay between federal and
state laws is critical to an effective emergency response. In
the event of an avian flu pandemic, or a similar public
health emergency, both state and federal quarantine laws
would likely be invoked to control the spread of the disease.
To implement an effective quarantine that complies with
constitutional requirements, quarantine laws and response
efforts must be coordinated between all levels of
government.
The federal government is authorized to accept
assistance from state and local authorities in the
enforcement of quarantine regulations. 61 Similarly, the
federal government may assist state and local governments
in the prevention and suppression of communicable62
diseases and aid in the enforcement of their quarantine.
Regulations promulgated under Title 42 U.S.C. § 264
permit the Director of the CDC to take reasonably
necessary measures to prevent the spread of communicable
' 63
diseases whenever state or local efforts are "insufficient."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUARANTINE DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS

A. Substantive Due Process
65
The due process clauses of the Fifth6 4 and Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee the fairness of laws by stipulating
that the government shall not take a person's "life, liberty,

60. See Kristin Choo, The Avian Flu Time Bomb: The Legal System Will
Play a Key Role in Planning the Response to a Possible Onslaught of the Virus,

A.B.A. J., Nov. 2005, at 36, 39.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 243(a) (2000).

62. See id.
63. 42 C.F.R. § 70.2 (2005).
64. "[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is
applicable only to the federal government.
65. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment is applicable only to state governments.
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or property without due process of law." Courts not only
review quarantine regulations to scrutinize the procedural
protections provided, but also to determine whether the
regulations achieve the objectives of the legislature through
reasonable means. 66 Substantive due process guarantees
that laws will be reasonable and not arbitrary. Within the
context of public health interventions, basic elements of
substantive due process include: (1) a demonstrated public
health necessity; (2) an effective intervention with a
demonstrable means-end connection; (3) proportionalitythe intervention is neither too narrowly or broadly tailored;
and (4) it is the least restrictive in terms of infringing on
individual rights while accomplishing its purpose, and does
not inflict unnecessary harm. 67
Quarantine can be an effective public health tool;
however, by its nature it is controversial in that it gives rise
to tensions between individual rights and broader
community interests. The history of quarantine in this
country also reveals its use as an instrument of prejudice
and subjugation. For example, during both World Wars, the
United
States
military
involuntarily
quarantined
thousands of prostitutes to prevent the spread of venereal
disease among American troops. 68 Thousands of women and
girls suspected of engaging in promiscuous sexual activities
with soldiers were committed to institutions; no similar
efforts were made to quarantine men. 69

66. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("At the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.").
67. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP
v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) ('This Court has repeatedly held that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.")); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("[E]ven though the governmental purpose be
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved."); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) ("In
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.").
68. See ALLAN M. BRANDT,

No MAGIC BULLET: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF

VENEREAL DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1880, at 84-92 (1985).

69. See id. at 86, 89.
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One of the most well known and controversial
quarantine cases is that of Mary Mallon, coined "Typhoid
Mary. ' 70 Mallon, an Irish immigrant who worked as a cook
in New York City around the turn of the twentieth century,
was a healthy carrier of typhoid fever. 71 She was twice
isolated against her will for a total of twenty-six years
72
without a trial, and without having violated any law.
Prejudice against her as an Irish immigrant and a defiant
woman of lower economic status is believed to have played
a role in her extended isolation. 73 These examples illustrate
the importance of legal limits-including due process and
equal protection-on quarantine measures.
Justice Harlan, in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, wrote:
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is
only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to
the equal enjoyment of the same right by others." 74 While
the individual's right to liberty cannot stand in the way of
protecting the public's health, substantive due process
prohibits state public health laws from75being applied in an
"arbitrary and oppressive" manner.
Justice Harlan's
acceptance of an exception to mandatory vaccination in
Jacobson, where the state of a person's health made it
"cruel and inhuman" to require vaccination, has been
limits on state
interpreted as establishing rational legal
76
public health actions, such as quarantine.
In 1900, a California federal court addressed the
discriminatory potential of quarantine in Wong Wai v.
Williamson.77 The court struck down a quarantine
resolution adopted by the San Francisco Board of Health
which required only Chinese residents in an area of the city

70. See generally JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT, TYPHOID MARY: CAPTIVE TO THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH (1996).
71. Id. at 14.

72. See id. at 2, 81-82.
73. See generally id. at 96-125.
74. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26-27 (1905).
75. See Parmet et al., supra, note 41, at 653 (discussing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11).
76. Id.
77. See Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
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known as the "Chinese Quarter" to be quarantined and
inoculated for bubonic plague. 78 The resolution deprived
those individuals
of personal
liberty
and
their
constitutionally protected right to travel in violation of
equal protection and substantive due process. 79 The court
noted that laws or regulations necessary to protect the
public health, which are appropriate measures intended 8to0
accomplish this end, are not subject to judicial review.
However, such measures "must have some relation to the
end in view, for, under the mere guise of the police power,
personal rights . . . will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily
8
invaded" by the legislature. '
The quarantine resolution in Wong Wai violated the
four basic elements of substantive due process.8 2 First,
there was not a demonstrated public health necessity
because there was no fact established by the defendants
that the disease was definitively bubonic plague.8 3 Second,
the resolution mandated an ineffective intervention that did
not have a demonstrable means-end connection. Despite the
fact that the vaccine was designed to be administered only
to prevent contagion from exposure and not as a treatment
after a person had been exposed to the disease, the
resolution mandated the administration of the vaccine
when individuals had potentially or definitely been
exposed.8 4 The resolution, therefore, did not meet the
requisite means-end effectiveness test because it had no
relation to the public health of the city inhabitants.8 5 Third,
the resolution lacked proportionality because although
there were almost 350,000 residents in the city, the
mandated quarantine did not apply to any residents other

78. See id.
79. See id. at 5.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying note 67.
83. See id. at 6 ("There is. . . no fact established by the board of supervisors
or by the board of health from which an inference might be drawn that any
particular class of persons, or persons occupying a particular district, were
liable to develop, or in danger of developing, the plague.").
84. See id. at 7-8.
85. See id. at 8-10.
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than Chinese or Asians.8 6 The resolution further violated
this element because it inflicted unnecessary harm. The
resolution mandated the vaccine8 7 at inappropriate times,
which had life threatening effects.
In Jew Ho v. Williamson, San Francisco health officials
diagnosed nine fatal cases of what was alleged to be bubonic
plague in that same Chinese neighborhood discussed in
Wong Wai.8 8 Consequently, the San Francisco Board of
Health adopted a second resolution authorizing the Board
to quarantine twelve city blocks in which some ten
thousand Chinese residents lived.8 9 The issue was whether
or not the quarantine was reasonable and necessary. 90 The
Ninth Circuit held that the quarantine violated substantive
due process because it was not a reasonable regulation to
accomplish the purpose sought-to prevent the spread of
the bubonic plague. 9 1 Expert testimony disputed the
existence of the plague and suggested that it could have
been a number of other diseases. 92 Further, if the disease
was the bubonic plague, the quarantine resolution did not
attempt to confine the individuals to their homes to stop the
spread of infection, but rather allowed intercommunication
within the quarantined district, increasing the likelihood
the disease would spread. 93 While facially neutral, the
quarantine had been implemented in such a way that it
discriminated against only the Chinese 94 population and
therefore violated equal protection as well.
Wong Wai and Jew Ho are early examples of
substantive due process challenges to isolation and
quarantine orders, despite the broad police powers
recognized by courts at that time. It was not until the mid1960s and 1970s, after the majority of quarantine cases
86. See id. at 6.
87. See id. at 7-8.
88. Jew Ho v. Williamson,103 F. 10, 11 (N.D. Cal. 1900); see also Wong Wai
v. Williamson, 103 F. 1, 6 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
89. See id. at 11-13.
90. Id. at 20-21.
91. See id. at 21-24.
92. See id. at 21, 24.
93. Id. at 22-23.
94. See id. at 26.
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were decided, that the due process clauses were interpreted
by courts as placing substantive limits on laws and
regulations that deprive individuals of fundamental
rights. 95 Prior to that time, courts often deferred to state
statutes that fell within the police power to protect public
96
health.
The revival of substantive due process has since meant
that laws involving fundamental liberty rights are now
subject to constitutional scrutiny. 97 Where a law or
government action limits a fundamental right, or implicates
a suspect class, strict scrutiny will be applied. The law will
be upheld only if it is necessary to promote a compelling or
overriding governmental interest. The fundamental rights
98
recognized by the Supreme Court fall into four categories:
freedom of association and other First Amendment rights; 99
the right to vote;100 the right to travel; 101 and the right 102
to
privacy, which includes freedom of choice in marriage,
child bearing, 103 and child rearing. 0 4 In all other cases, the

95. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1306-09 (2d ed.
1988).
96. But see Jew Ho, 103 F. 10; Wong Wai v. Williamson, 103 F. 1 (N.D. Cal.
1900) (illustrating successful substantive due process challenges to isolation
and quarantine orders).
97. See Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine:The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 77 (1985).
98. See generally RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.7 (3d ed. 1999).
99. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
100. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
101. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
102. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967).
103. This involves several particular rights or freedoms. See Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (purchase of contraceptives); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942) (reproductive ability, sterilization).
104. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (private
education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). But see Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming the state's authority to
restrict parental authority). Today, these particular decisions might be viewed
as relating to certain First Amendment rights, but the Supreme Court
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rationality standard is applied. In the context of a
community emergency and the threat of an infectious
disease, courts would likely defer to the judgment of a
legislative body, invoking rational review, and would
require the government to show a legitimate state interest
05
and that the law is rationally related to that interest.
However, in the presence of an equal protection issue
involving a suspect classification or an overburdening of a
fundamental right, courts may apply strict scrutiny.
O'Connor v. Donaldson,10 6 a case involving the
involuntary commitment of a mentally ill individual,
illustrates a substantive due process challenge to a public
health intervention. In O'Connor, the Supreme Court
addressed Donaldson's right to liberty because he had been
kept in a mental hospital against his will for fifteen
years.' 0 7 Donaldson challenged the fifteen years of
confinement he was forced to endure despite his repeated
requests for release. 08 The jury found that "[he] was
neither dangerous to himself nor to others, and also found
that, if mentally ill, [he] had not received treatment."'10 9
Absent public safety concerns or the need for mental health
treatment, the jury found no grounds for Donaldson's
continued confinement. 110 The Court found that a finding of
mental illness alone could not justify a state involuntarily
confining a person indefinitely against his will."'
Therefore, the mental hospital's superintendent, as an

addresses them as relating to a fundamental right. See Carey v. Population
Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Relying on the fundamental
constitutional nature of the relationship between parents and children, the
Supreme Court ruled that a state could not deny an indigent woman an appeal
from a trial court decision terminating her parental rights solely on the grounds
that she could not pay a mandatory fee for the preparation of a trial court
record. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
105. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737-38 (1972).
106. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
107. Id. at 564.
108. Id. at 564-65.
109. Id. at 573.
110. Id. at 573-74.
111. Id. at 575.
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agent of the state, violated
Donaldson's substantive due
112
process right to liberty.
Should an avian flu pandemic or bioterrorism event
strike, government actions and orders to isolate or
quarantine individuals infected or believed to be infected
with a communicable disease must comply with this overall
substantive due process analysis. A public health
intervention in search of a rationale or justification is a
substantive due process problem. The governmental
purpose of controlling and preventing the spread of
infectious disease may not be "achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms." 113 This effectively requires that any
government action or order be proportional to the public
health threat. The proper balance between protecting the
public health and the individual's liberty interest must be
fact specific. The more sweeping the proposed isolation or
quarantine in terms of number and geographic scope, the
more factual support, such as clinical evidence or expert
testimony, will be required to illustrate the necessity and
warrant the liberty intrusion.
B. ProceduralDue Process
Fairness in process and procedure lies at the core of due
process concerns and must be incorporated into isolation
and quarantine laws. The basic elements of procedural due
process include: (1) reasonable and adequate notice directed
to the affected individual of the action that the government
is purporting to take, typically through a written order; (2)
an opportunity for a hearing at a reasonable time and
manner to contest the government's action, typically
through the right to present evidence and witnesses and to
contest the government's evidence and witnesses; (3) access
to legal counsel; and (4) a final administrative decision that
is subject to review in a court of law by an impartial

112. Id. at 575-76.
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
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decision-maker. 114 For public health purposes, such as
quarantine, due process does not always require a judicial
hearing or a proceeding akin to a criminal trial. 115 Because
quarantine implicates an individual's liberty interest to
remain free from physical restraint, all levels of
government-federal, state, and local-must act in a
manner consistent with the basic elements of procedural
due process when carrying out quarantine actions.
Quarantine, the physical separation of one or more
exposed or potentially exposed individuals (from healthy
individuals), imposes restrictions on freedom of movement,
constituting "bodily restraint." Freedom from bodily
restraint constitutes the core of the liberty interest
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 1 6 The Supreme Court has stated, "[i]t is clear
that commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection." 117 However, as compulsory isolation and
quarantine illustrate, the liberty interest to be free from
physical restraint is not absolute, even in the civil
8
context. 1
Procedural due process expectations are best viewed as
a continuum. A continuum framework works well because
the nature of what "process" is "due" is not the same in
114. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970). See generally JOHN
DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY (2003) (discussing the
historical origins behind the concept of a neutral judge).
V. ORTH,

115. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) ("Although we
acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric diagnosis, we do not
accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided by
shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of
medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a
judicial-type hearing." (citation omitted)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431
(1979) (holding that states need not apply the strict criminal standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt before committing the mentally ill); Morales v.
Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977) (noting in dicta that "[a] state should
not be required to provide the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial when
imposing a quarantine to protect the public against a highly communicable
disease.").
116. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
117. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361
(1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1997).
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every circumstance. '[D]ue process,' unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances. . . . [It] is
compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions.
-119 Thus, "due process is flexible and calls for such
procedural protections
as the particular situation
demands. 1 20 The level of process granted is required to be
commensurate with the degree
of deprivation and the
21
circumstances of the event.1
In the event a large-scale quarantine is imposed in the
United States, viewing the fact-specific concept of
procedural due process from a continuum framework will
provide the necessary flexibility for public health officials
and the court system to adapt to unexpected and
individualized situations. On the far left of the continuum
are identified individuals who have a definitive diagnosis
for a communicable disease and for whom isolation is the
appropriate public health tool. Moving right on the
continuum are individuals who exhibit symptoms, but the
diagnosis has not yet been confirmed. On the far right,
quarantine becomes the appropriate public health tool and
legal, scientific, political, and social issues become more
complicated. Procedural due process safeguards should
increase, from left to right, along this continuum because
the level of restraint on liberty increases.
Courts make a determination as to what procedures are
necessary by applying the test articulated by the Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.122 In determining the
constitutional adequacy of protective procedures provided in
any given law, an analysis of governmental and private

119. Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
120. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
121. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 (1979) ("What process is
constitutionally due cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision
that is being made.").
122. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See, e.g., Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330-31
(1993); Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127-28 (1990); United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 274 (1984);
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
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interests is required. 123 Mathews dictates that the process
due in any given instance is determined by weighing three
factors: (1) the importance of the individual interest that
will be affected by the official action; (2) the value of specific
procedural safeguards to that specific individual's interest;
and (3) the governmental interest, including the fiscal and
administrative
burdens
that additional
procedural
124
safeguards would entail.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld illustrates how the Mathews test is
applied. 125 Although Hamdi does not involve quarantine
law, it is a recent example of how the Supreme Court
applies the balancing test when an individual's liberty is at
stake. It is also a noteworthy example of the conflicts of
interest at the due process balancing point. 126 The
petitioners, a citizen-detainee and his father, petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.127 The
Fourth Circuit ordered the petition dismissed, finding that
the citizen-detainee's detention was legally authorized and
that he was entitled to no further opportunity to challenge
his enemy-combatant label. 128 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of what process is
constitutionally due
to a citizen who disputes his enemycombatant status. 129
Hamdi's private interest was the "most elemental of
liberty interests-the interest in being free from physical
detention by one's own government."'130 The weight on this
side of the Mathews scale was not offset by the
circumstances of war or the accusation of treasonous
behavior, for "[i]t is clear that commitment for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires

123. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334.
124. See id. at 334-35.
125. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-35 (2004).
126. For a similar comparison regarding constitutional conflicting interests
of providing for the common defense and due process, see Franklin H. Alden,
Jr., Comment, Liberty or Death: Maryland Improves Upon the Model State
Emergency Health PowersAct, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 185, 195-96 (2005).
127. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511.
128. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir.) (2003).
129. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507.
130. Id. at 529.
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due process protection." 131 The Court noted that as critical
as the government's interest may be in detaining those who
pose an immediate threat to national security, history and
common sense dictate that an unchecked system of
detention carries the potential for abuse of others who do
not present such a threat. 132 Therefore, the starting point
for the Mathews analysis was unaltered by the allegations
surrounding Hamdi or the organizations
with which he was
33
alleged to have associated.1
The Court considered that on the other side of the scale
were weighty and sensitive governmental interests in
ensuring that Hamdi did not return to fight with the enemy
against the United States. 134 The government argued that
heightened trial-like process would unnecessarily and
dangerously distract military officers, result in a futile
search for evidence buried under the rubble of war, and
discovery into military operations would intrude on
sensitive secrets of national defense. 135 The Court indicated
that to the extent those burdens were triggered by
heightened procedures, they were taken into account in the
due process analysis. 136
The Court recognized the competing concerns and
struck a balance, holding that Hamdi was entitled to notice
of the factual basis for his classification and a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions
before a neutral decisionmaker. 137 The Hamdi case
illustrates that the Mathews test does not necessarily have
neat or distinguishable steps, but is a well thought out
balance and consideration of the three factors.

131. Id. at 530 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983)).
132. Id. at 530.
133. See id. at 531.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 531-32.
136. Id. at 532.
137. See id. at 533.
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C. Evolution of Due Process Requirements within the
Context of Communicable Diseases: Isolation and
QuarantineChallenges
As discussed in Part I, long-standing precedent has
given Congress and the states broad power to enact
quarantine and other public health laws, and to have them
executed by public health officials. 138 In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, quarantine was used against
acute, short-lived communicable diseases. 139 To be effective
in controlling the spread of such diseases, quarantine had
to be implemented immediately. During this period, broad
authority was given to state health officials under state
quarantine statutes, and courts frequently upheld the
validity of quarantine pursuant to such statutes without
considering substantive due process. 140 Furthermore, state
statutes, at that time, generally did not require that
quarantine be accompanied by a judicial order, notice, or a
hearing. 141 The broad authority of health officials and the
absence of legal 142
safeguards is illustrated in the 1876 case of
Haverty v. Bass.
In Haverty, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
upheld a statute permitting municipal officers to remove a
person infected with "a disease dangerous to the public
health" to a separate house without first obtaining a
warrant. 143 The court stated:
We do not perceive how it could be of importance to the sick man,
whether a warrant was obtained or not. It would be the merest
form in the world, as far as he is concerned. There is no provision

138. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905); Compagnie
Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S.
380 (1902); United States v. Shinnick, 219 F. Supp. 789 (E.D.N.Y. 1963).
139. See, e.g., Highland v. Schulte, 82 N.W. 62 (Mich. 1900) (smallpox);
Young v. Flower, 22 N.Y.S. 332 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (cholera); Beckwith v.
Sturtevant, 42 Conn. 158 (1875) (smallpox); Harrison v. Mayor of Baltimore, 1
Gill 264 (Md. 1843) (smallpox and typhus).
140. See Parmet, supra note 97, at 59-60.
141. Id. at 77.
142. Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71 (1876).
143. Id. at 71.
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for any examination by the justices, nor for notice to any parties to
44
be heard, nor could any appeal be had.1

The absence of procedural protections, such as mechanisms
by which the individual could appeal, was not viewed as a
constitutional defect by the court. Substantive due process,
therefore, was not a consideration. Rather, the court's view
in the circumstances, was merely that "[t]he individual
right sinks in the necessity to provide for the public
good." 145 The court noted, however, that habeas corpus was
146
always an option.
In a 1917 case, Crayton v. Larabee, the New York State
Court of Appeals upheld the quarantine of a woman who
was not sick, but lived next door to someone infected with
smallpox. 147 The plaintiff alleged that she had been
wrongfully detained because she was not "infected with or
exposed to" the disease as required under the relevant state
law. 148 However, the court ruled that the statute was a
valid health regulation under the police power of the state
and the statute had a broader meaning than the plaintiffs
interpretation. 149 "Among all the objects to be secured by
governmental laws none is more important than the
preservation of the public health .... [P]owers conferred for
so greatly needed and most useful purposes should receive a
liberal construction for the advancement of the ends for
which they were bestowed."'150 The state regulation vested
in the health officer a discretionary power to quarantine "as
he deems necessary" to protect the public's health.' 5 '
To illustrate how the framework of due process as a
continuum may be applied, the isolated individual in
Haverty would fall on the left of the continuum because he
was clearly ill with an identified infectious disease. In
comparison, the individual subjected to quarantine in
144. Id. at 73.
145. Id. at at 74.
146. Id.
147. See Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355, 359 (N.Y. 1917).
148. See id. at 357.
149. See id. at 358-59.
150. See id. at 358 (citation omitted).
151. See id. at 358.
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Crayton would fall on the right of the continuum and,
hence, was owed greater due process protections because
her contact with an infected neighbor was only suspected.
Nonetheless, by contemporary standards, neither received
sufficient due process and the power of public health
officials in both cases was determinative.
Some courts during this early period, however, did set
limits on the discretion of public health officials to enact
quarantine measures. In Kirk v. Wyman, the local board of
health issued an order that a former missionary afflicted
with leprosy was to leave the city or be isolated in a
pesthouse, which had previously been used for individuals
afflicted with smallpox. 15 3 The Supreme Court of South
Carolina stated that it was obvious the board of health was
within its duty in requiring the patient to be isolated, but
the case turned on whether the isolation was "so clearly
beyond what was necessary to the public protection that the
court ought to enjoin it as arbitrary."'154 The Kirk court
found that although regulations requiring isolation of
infected persons for the protection of public health are
constitutional, boards of health are not entitled to arbitrary
power over such persons, and may not deprive any person of
property or liberty, unless the deprivation by due inquiry is
"reasonably necessary to the public health."' 55 Significantly,
the court engaged in a substantive due process review,
requiring officials to adopt a less restrictive alternative 56 in
enforcing isolation measures, thereby limiting the
discretion of health authorities.
Later isolation and quarantine cases markedly reflect
advancements in epidemiology. Following World War I,
venereal diseases and tuberculosis were most often the
subject of litigated quarantine orders. 157 With both
diseases, individuals could be quarantined for long periods

153. Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 388 (S.C. 1909).
154. Id. at 390.
155. Id. at 389-90.
156. It was decided that Miss Kirk would be isolated in a cottage to be built
for her outside the city and she was not forced to be isolated in the pesthouse.
Id. at 391.
157. Parmet, supra note 97, at 69.
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of time because the incubation period and treatment were
158
lengthy, and neither disease resulted in death quickly.
By the middle of the twentieth century, venereal disease
and tuberculosis were treatable, and presented less of a
threat to the community than the plague or smallpox had in
an earlier age.1 59 Therefore, courts and health officials could
afford the time and had the evidentiary basis to be
160
concerned with matters of proof and legal procedure.
Wendy Parmet, of Northeastern University School of Law,
summed the phenomenon up well: "As science provided
more methods of fighting disease, and more ways to
understand it, courts could begin to question
the methods
161
proposed by experts for controlling disease."'
Nonetheless, some courts were still hostile to due
process challenges to quarantine orders. In the case of Ex
Parte Caselli, the petitioner was quarantined after a
diagnosis of gonorrhea. 162 The petitioner applied for a writ
of habeas corpus to obtain her release on the ground, inter
alia, that she was not granted a judicial hearing prior to her
detainment. 163 The
Supreme
Court
of Montana
acknowledged the petitioner's right to habeas corpus, but
clearly rejected the notion that individuals quarantined to
stop the spread of contagious disease are entitled to a
hearing in the first instance because it would render the
quarantine inoperative. 164 The court went even further,
stating that the Fourteenth Amendment had no application
to quarantine cases since it would render the state
powerless to act against contagious disease. 65 Unlike the
court in this case, modern courts must apply the Fourteenth
Amendment to cases of state-imposed quarantine. However,
case law in addition to Ex Parte Caselli suggests that a
hearing may be held after the start of detainment in an

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Exparte Caselli, 204 P. 364 (Mont. 1922).
163. Id. at 364.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 364-65.
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is of an
emergency, presumably where the incubation period
166
unknown length, to protect the public's health.
Hostility to due process challenges continued in the
early 2 0th century. In Ex parte Company, the Ohio Supreme
Court did little to hide its frustration with challenges to
quarantine regulation for venereal disease. 167 The court
declared: "There is perhaps no provision of the federal
Constitution that is more overworked than the Fourteenth
Amendment. Counsel generally are apparently unanimous
in thinking that any judgment or finding as against the
protection of the laws, or
client denies such client the equal
1 68
is without due process of law.'
The broad authority granted to health officials was still
apparent in the 1952 decision of Moore v. Draper. 69 In
Moore, the Supreme Court of Florida denied the petitioner's
writ of habeas corpus, by which he sought release from
isolation for tuberculosis, arguing that the state statute,
inter alia, violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 170 The court upheld the quarantine statute,
reasoning that necessary laws or regulations regarding
public health is a legislative question, and "appropriate
measures intended and calculated to accomplish these ends
are not subject to judicial review."'171 Further, it declared
that the courts will not interfere with the exercise of the
regulations
state police power except where the quarantine
' 172
are "arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable."
Some courts at that time, however, did demand greater
due process protections. In State v. Snow, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to order the respondent,

166. See Parmet, supra note 97, at 80; see, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (noting that the law has traditionally
upheld prompt inspections without a warrant in emergencies); N. Am. Cold
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315 (1908) (explaining that the
state has the right to seize and destroy spoiled and unwholesome food even
though no notice and opportunity to be heard are given).
167. Exparte Company,139 N.E. 204 (Ohio 1922).
168. Id. at 205.
169. Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 649 (citations omitted).
172. Id. (citations omitted).
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suspected of having communicable tuberculosis, into
isolation until sufficient findings of active tuberculosis were
presented. 173 The significance of Snow is that while the
court recognized the importance of proceedings by the State
for the commitment of tubercular persons to protect the
public's health, it also recognized the need for quarantine
statutes "to be strictly construed to protect the rights of the
citizen."'174 This stands in contrast to the earlier Crayton
decision, which gave a "liberal construction" of power to
public health officials to carry out quarantine statutes. 75 A
partial explanation is that during the forty-two years
separating the Crayton and Snow decisions, medical
research as well as the law, with respect to recognition of
individual rights, had evolved considerably.
It is noteworthy that the Snow court made an analogy
between involuntary confinement for communicable
diseases and involuntary confinement for mental illness.
Justice McFaddin wrote, "Like an insanity proceeding, this
is neither a civil nor a criminal proceeding, but rather it is a
special proceeding by the State in its character of parens
patriae,based on the theory that the public his an interest
to be protected." 76
Seven years after Snow, the California Court of Appeals
decided In re Halko.177 The petitioner, who was diagnosed
with active tuberculosis, was ordered into isolation in the
security side of a hospital pursuant to provisions of the
California Health and Safety Code. 178 Thereafter, a county
public health officer served him with four successive orders
of isolation each for a period of six months. 179 After almost
two years in isolation, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas
corpus contending that the state statute deprived him of his
liberty without due process of law. Provisions of the
relevant law allowed the health officer to issue consecutive
certifications of isolation, "without means of questioning
173. State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Ark. 1959).
174. See id.
175. See Crayton v. Larabee, 116 N.E. 355, 358 (N.Y. 1917).
176. Snow, 324 S.W.2d at 534.
177. In re Halko, 246 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1966).
178. Id. at 662.
179. Id.
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and judicially
determining" the conclusion of the health
80
officer.'
The In re Halko court disagreed with the petitioner,
finding that any person who was confined pursuant to a
quarantine order issued by a health officer under the
California Health and Safety Code was not entitled to relief
on habeas corpus where the evidence showed reasonable
cause to believe that person is infected. 181 However,
individuals quarantined without reasonable grounds are
entitled to relief by habeas corpus. 8 2 Since the petitioner
had not disputed the finding that he was afflicted with
tuberculosis, the court held that there had been no
deprivation of due process rights. 8 3 Further, the court
found that the law permits consecutive orders for
quarantine as long as the individual continues to be
infected with tuberculosis and is reasonably believed
by the
18 4
health officer to be dangerous to the public health.
In Halko and Snow, although factually similar in that
both dealt with individuals infected or potentially infected
with contagious tuberculosis, the courts arrived at different
conclusions as to whether isolation was to be ordered.
Halko is illustrative of previous cases which gave health
authorities broad discretion to isolate individuals who
threatened the public's health, provided their acts were not
arbitrary and were based on a reasonable belief that the
individual was infected. 8 5 Additionally, the tuberculosis in
Halko was confirmed to be active. Whereas, Snow is
illustrative of limits on such discretion and favors greater
protection of individual due process rights. Even though it
was reasonable that the tuberculosis was in an infectious
stage at the time in question, the Snow court did not order

180. Id.

181. See id. at 662-63.
182. Id. at 664.
183. See id.
184. Id.

185. See, e.g., Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952); Crayton, 116 N.E.
355; Haverty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71 (1876); Rosemary G. Reilly, Combating the
TuberculosisEpidemic: The Legality of Coercive Treatment Methods, 27 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 101, 116 (1993).
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isolation because
the findings did not meet a preponderance
1 86
of evidence.
D. Development of ProceduralDue Process Requirements for
Involuntary Detention
Few courts have considered the procedural due process
requirements of quarantined individuals; however, many
have considered procedural protections in the context of
involuntary commitment for mental illness. "The state has
a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in
providing care to its citizens who are unable" to care for
themselves due to mental or physical illness.1 8 7 The power
of the state as parens patriae is not unlimited-it is not an
"invitation to procedural arbitrariness."'' 8 8 The state, under
the authority of its police power, also has an interest in
protecting the community from threats, such ' as "the
dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. 189
States rely on civil commitment procedures to
accommodate these interests. A civil commitment carries
with it a loss of liberty for treatment, not punitive,
purposes. However, there is no state interest in confining
individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill and
can safely live in freedom because they are not dangereous
to themselves or others. 190 Additionally, if an individual is
involuntarily confined, the confinement must cease when
the reasons for commitment disappear. 191
Procedural due process applies to restraints on physical
liberty in both criminal and non-criminal settings.
Involuntary detention where no crime has been committed
186. See State v. Snow, 324 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Ark. 1959).
187. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (referring to those who
cannot take care of themselves because of emotional disorders); see also Snow,
324 S.W.2d at 534 (referring to those who cannot take care of themselves
because of physical illness).
188. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966)).
189. Addington, 441 U.S. at 426.
190. Id.; see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
191. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) ("At the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.").
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involves a balancing of the state's duty to protect the
public's health and safety with the liberty interests and due
process rights of the individual to be detained. In the late
1960s and throughout the 1970s, procedural due process
protections for individuals involuntarily detained expanded,
particularly in the area of civil commitment of the mentally
111.192 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
"civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant
deprivation of liberty that requires
due process
protection." 193 Although the parameters of the process
required may differ depending on the type of action, 194 due
process protections are guaranteed in civil commitments of
juvenile delinquents, 195 mandating sex offenders to various
treatment programs, 196 and commitment of the mentally
ill. 197

A 1967 Supreme Court decision, Specht v. Patterson,198
involved a petitioner who was convicted in state court for
indecent liberties under a Colorado statute that carried a
maximum sentence of ten years. However, he was not
sentenced under that statute, but rather under the
confusing Colorado Sex Offenders Act. 199 This act did not
make the commission of a specified crime the basis for
sentencing; rather, Colorado criminal procedure made the
conviction for specified sex offenses, such as the one the
petitioner committed, as the basis for commencing another
proceeding under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act. 200
Therefore, the petitioner was sentenced under a new and
192. See infra text accompanying notes 196-211.
193. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 425; see, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715; Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1;
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
194. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976).
195. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1.

196. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Humphrey, 405
U.S. 504.
197. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
198. Specht, 386 U.S. 605.
199. Id. at 607.
200. Id. at 608. The Colorado Sex Offenders Act came into play where the
district court was of the opinion that any person convicted of specified sex
offenses constituted a threat of bodily harm to the public, or was a habitual
offender and mentally ill. Id. at 607.
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greater charge without notice and a full hearing. 20 1 The
Supreme Court held that the petitioner was entitled to a
full judicial hearing before the more severe sentence was
imposed because the state could not involuntary confine the
petitioner without due process measures required under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 202 Procedural due process, in this
instance, entitled the detainee to have the right at the
hearing to "be present with counsel, have an opportunity to
be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have
the right
to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his
20 3
own."

In that same year, the Supreme Court held in In re
Gault that juvenile delinquency proceedings which may
lead to commitment in a state institution "must measure up
20 4
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment."
Specifically, the child and his parents were entitled to: (1) a
hearing; (2) notice of the specific charge or factual
allegations, given sufficiently in advance of the hearing to
permit preparation; (3) notification of the child's right to be
represented by counsel, and if they are unable to afford
counsel, that counsel would be appointed to represent the
child; (4) application of the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination; and (5) an order of commitment based on
sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for crossexamination.205
The following year, the Supreme Court in Addington v.
Texas addressed the standard of proof to be applied in a
civil commitment proceeding. 20 6 The Court found civil
commitment to be a significant deprivation of liberty
requiring the state to justify confinement by proof greater
than a mere preponderance of the evidence. 20 7 The
reasonable doubt standard used in criminal prosecutions
was rejected because of the unlikelihood that the state

201. Id. at 607.
202. Id. at 608.
203. Id. at 610.
204. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967) (quoting Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541, 562 (1966)).
205. See id. at 33-57.
206. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
207. Id. at 427.
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could ever meet such a burden in a civil commitment
proceeding given the fallibility and lack of certainty of
psychiatric diagnosis. 208 The Addington Court held that a
mid-level burden of proof "strikes a fair balance between
the rights of the individual and the legitimate concerns of
the state. '209 Therefore, the required standard to apply to
civil commitments to meet due process guarantees is "equal
to or greater than the 'clear and convincing' standard,"210the
precise determination of which is a matter of state law.
One year later, the Supreme Court held in Vitek v.
Jones that even a convicted felon was entitled to the benefit
of procedural protections in a commitment hearing before
he was declared to have a mental illness and transferred to
a mental hospital. 211 Of particular relevance to quarantine
for communicable disease, the Court determined that even
though the determination of whether the individual is
mentally ill is essentially medical, the "medical nature of
the inquiry ... does not justify dispensing with due process
requirements. ' '21 2 Such a deprivation of liberty required the
following due process protections: written notice of the
transfer; an adversary hearing before an independent
decisionmaker; right to present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses against him; right to counsel; written
findings,
3
and; effective and timely notice of such rights. 21
E. Application of ProceduralDue Process Requirements to
Quarantineof Communicable Diseases
Involuntary detainment for mental illness has been
analogized to involuntary detainment for communicable
disease, thus giving rise to similar procedural due process
requirements. In the 1980 decision, Greene v. Edwards, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that the
same procedural protections afforded to those involuntarily
208. See id. at 428-31.
209. Id. at 431.
210. Id. at 433. For example, in New York State the government must
sustain its petition calling for involuntary detention of a person by clear and
convincing evidence. Bradley v. Crowell, 694 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
211. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
212. Id. at 495.
213. Id. at 494-95.
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committed for mental illness should be applied 214
to
quarantined individuals with communicable diseases.
Greene was involuntarily confined under an order of the
county court pursuant to the West Virginia Tuberculosis
Control Act (the "Act"). 215 The West Virginia Department of
Health had filed a petition alleging that Greene was
suffering from active tuberculosis, was a danger to the
health of others, and needed to be committed. 21 6 Although
notice of the hearing was given to Greene, he was not
notified of his right to be represented by counsel. Only after
the hearing had begun was counsel appointed, and no
recess was taken to allow him the opportunity to consult his
217
attorney.
Greene filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing an
absence of adequate due process. 218 The court reasoned that
the purpose of the Act, to prevent a person suffering from
contagious tuberculosis from becoming a danger to others,
was analogous to the rationale underlying the state statute
governing involuntary confinement of a mentally ill
person. 219 Consequently, the court found that the due
process requirements afforded to mentally ill persons under
the state statute governing involuntary hospitalization
must also be afforded to isolated persons charged under the
Act. 220 The court reasoned that involuntary commitment for
communicable tuberculosis and mental illness implicated
liberty interests to a similar extent, therefore, persons
charged under the Act must be afforded:
(1) an adequate written notice detailing the grounds and
underlying facts on which commitment is sought; (2) the right to
counsel and, if indigent, the right to appointed counsel; (3) the
right to be present, to cross-examine, to confront and to present
witnesses; (4) the standard of proof to be by clear, cogent and

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 662 (W. Va. 1980).
Id. at 661-62.
Id. at 662.
Id.
See id. at 661-62.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
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convincing evidence; and (5) the right 2to
a verbatim transcript of
21
the proceedings for purposes of appeal.

Given that counsel was not appointed for Greene until
after the commitment hearing had begun, the court found
that his counsel could not have been prepared to defend
him, thus Greene's writ of habeas
corpus was granted, and
222
he was given a new hearing.
Similar to the reasoning in Greene, the New York
Supreme Court of Suffolk County in Bradley v. Crowell
determined the burden of proof to be applied in a petition
hearing seeking involuntary detention of an individual with
communicable tuberculosis. 223 In an issue of first
impression, the court stated: "[T]his situation is analogous
to situations where, because of mental infirmity, a person is
sought to be detained in a mental facility against his will..
, 224 Therefore, Addington v. Texas was controlling and
the court held that a petition requesting involuntary
detention of someone with communicable disease must be
proven by "clear and convincing evidence." 225
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on
what specific due process procedures are owed to
quarantined individuals. Nevertheless, the Court has
maintained that involuntary confinement for any purpose
constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty requiring due
process protection. 226 The Greene and Bradley courts and
various authors have maintained that courts should uphold
the same due process requirements for quarantines as are
demanded for civil commitments. 227 These due process
protections are instructive in the context of quarantine,

221. Id. at 663.
222. Id. at 663.
223. Bradley v. Crowell, 694 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct. 1999).
224. Id. at 618.
225. See id.
226. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
227. See Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980); Bradley,
694 N.Y.S.2d 617, 618; Paula Mindes, Tuberculosis Quarantine:A Review of
Legal Issues in Ohio and Other States, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 403, 416-18 (1996);

Parmet, supra note 97, at 79-81; Reilly, supra note 185, at 129.
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however, a continuum of procedural due process may work
best for individualized quarantine circumstances.
F. Continuum Legal Framework
The analogy to civil commitments is imperfect in the
context of quarantine. The legal framework of a continuum
may more appropriately suggest the apt level of procedural
safeguards, allowing the nuances of both isolation and
quarantine to be considered. Such an analogy is warranted
where on the far left of the continuum individuals are
justifiably isolated because there is a definitive diagnosis of
an infectious disease for identified individuals. In those
instances, the detention is relatively straightforward
legally, scientifically, politically, and socially. An analogy to
civil commitments of the mentally ill, who have not
committed any crime but are either dangerous to
themselves or others, is appropriate because those ill with
infectious diseases are dangerous to others as well.
Protecting the community's health outweighs the
individual's right to liberty, especially where it is simple to
determine who should be isolated, where to do so, and for
how long. However, an analogy to civil commitments is not
necessarily appropriate for quarantined individuals, who
may or may not be ill with an infectious disease, because
they may not be dangerous to others. Quarantine is further
along on the continuum and requires greater procedural
due process protections.
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Figure 1. Procedural Due Process Continuum

Preonderance of
Evidence

Extent and timeliness of procedural due process

Isolation

Clear and Convincing
Evidence

Quarantine

Definitive Diagnosis

SuspectedExposure

State interest in protecting public health

Appropriateness of civil commitment analogy

Isolation and quarantine pose contemporary concerns in
addition to due process. This includes having a safe and
habitable environment during the isolation or quarantine
and being treated fairly. Isolation and quarantine are
designed to promote the public's health, not to punish the
individual, therefore, public health authorities have the
obligation to provide decent quarters. 228 There is no doubt
that this would be extremely challenging in the event of a
pandemic, but degrading settings such as jails or prisons
are inappropriate. 229 Modern public health practice favors
"sheltering in place," preferably in a person's home. 23 0
Home quarantines assume voluntary compliance, however,
an assumption of compliance could be problematic in 231a
modern day quarantine in the United States.
228. See Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe
Infectious Disease Threats, 290 JAMA 3229, 3234 (2003).
229. See id.
230. See Gostin et al., supra note 228, at 3234.
231. See generally Robert J. Blendon et al., Attitudes Toward the Use of
Quarantine in a Public Health Emergency in Four Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF.
W15
(2006),
http://content.healthaffairs.orglcgi/contentlabstract/25/2/wl5.
Civilian noncompliance with quarantine orders could compromise public health
efforts and even become violent. Barbera et al., supra note 21, at 2715.
Quarantine incidents in the past have generated organized civil disobedience
and disregard for authority. Id. That is why voluntary quarantine would be
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Additionally, issues such as job security and loss of income
of individuals subject to isolation or quarantine are a
matter of concern. 232
III. CURRENT QUARANTINE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS

A. State ProceduralDue Process Requirements:
1. The Model State Emergency Health Act and The
Turning Point Model State Public Health Act. The National
Association of Attorneys General issued a resolution in
December of 2003 urging states to review their public
health laws. 233 The majority of state statutes were passed
several decades ago and have not been amended since to
account for changes in medical and public health
circumstances. 234 Although each state has its own laws
addressing isolation and quarantine, two important model
acts have been promulgated to guide states in the updating
process. It was not intended that all states enact the same
statutes since "[t]he essence of federalism is that states
must be free to develop a variety of solutions to problems
and not be forced into a common, uniform mold. ' 235 Two
model acts, the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act
('MSEHPA") 2 36 and the Turning Point Model State Public
considerably more effective than a court-ordered quarantine as a public health
response to a pandemic. See Mark A. Rothstein, Are TraditionalPublic Health

Strategies Consistent with Contemporary American Values?, 77 TEMP. L. REV.
175, 191-92 (2004). Voluntary quarantine is dependant on "a shared sense of
community and public perceptions of the necessity and effectiveness of
quarantine." Id. at 192.
232. See Gostin et al., supra note 228, at 3234.
233. Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen., Resolution: Urging States to Review
their Public Health Laws (Dec. 2003), available at http://www.public
healthlaw.net/ Resources[ResourcesPDFs/PHL%20NAAG.pdf.

234. Id.
235. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 431.
236. THE MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POWERS ACT (Ctr. for Law & the

Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins Univs., Proposed Official Draft
2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.netfMSEHPA/MSEHPA2.pdf
[hereinafter MSEHPA]. For additional background information on and analysis
of the MSEHPA, see Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public
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Health Act ("Turning Point Act"), 237 include provisions that
States may adopt, either in whole or in part, to protect due
process rights in isolation and quarantine situations.
The MSEHPA was released on December 21, 2001,
following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, as a
cooperative effort between the Center for Law and the
Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins
Universities and the CDC. It was premised on the finding
that existing state laws were inadequate to confront
emergency health threats caused by bioterrorism and
epidemics; therefore, "development of a comprehensive plan
to provide a coordinated, appropriate response in the event
of a public health emergency" was needed. 238 The MSEHPA
grants specific emergency powers to state governors and
public health authorities, while at the same time protecting
the civil rights, liberties, and needs of infected or exposed
persons. As of July 15, 2006, thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia have passed bills that include
provisions from or closely related to the MSEHPA.239
The Turning Point Act, a product of the Public Health
Statute Modernization Collaborative that is comprised of
representatives from five states and nine national
organizations and government agencies, was published on
September 16, 2003. It is even more comprehensive in scope

Health Emergencies: Bioterrorism, Epidemics, and the Model State Emergency

Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 379 (2003); Alden, supra
note 126, at 188-202; Shenna Bradshaw, Note, Quarantined: Is Missouri
Prepared to Sacrifice Some of its Constitutional Freedoms to Ensure Public
Health Safety in an Outbreak?, 71 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REV. 939, 945-47 (2003);

Lorena Matei, Case Note, QuarantineRevision and the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act: "Laws for the Common Good," 18 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 433 (2002).
237. THE TURNING POINT MODEL STATE PUBLIC HEALTH ACT (Public Health

Statute Modernization Nat'l Excellence Collaborative 2003), available at
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/improving/turningpoint/PDFs[MSPHAweb.pdf
[hereinafter TURNING POINT ACT].

238. MSEHPA pmbl. at 6.
239. Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins
Univs., The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act Legislative Surveillance
Table (July 15, 2006), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA
MSEHPA%20Surveillance.pdf. The extent to which the MSEHPA's provisions
were incorporated into each state's laws varies. However, the Model State
Emergency Health Powers Act Legislative Surveillance Table provides insight
into the ways state legislatures have used the MSEHPA provisions. Id.

1338

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

than the MSEHPA in its attempt to address public health
law reform. It is intended to serve as a template and
checklist of issues that states and their agencies can use to
assess their preparedness. 240 The MSEHPA has been folded
into the "public health emergencies" section of the Turning
Point Act. As of October 24, 2006, thirty-three states have
introduced a total of one-hundred and ten legislative bills or
resolutions that are based upon or feature provisions
related to the Turning Point Act. 24 1 Of these bills, forty-four
242
have passed.
The MSEHPA explicitly acknowledges that "the rights
of people to liberty . . . must be respected to the fullest
extent possible consistent with maintaining and preserving
the public's health and security." 243 Sections 604 and 605 of
the MSEHPA provide for the implementation of quarantine
and isolation in the event of a public health emergency.
These provisions include most, if not all, the due process
requirements afforded to the mentally ill in civil
commitment proceedings. The procedures set forth in
Section 605 are divided into two categories depending upon
whether there is or is not adequate time for notice of
isolation and quarantine. Timing and providing procedural
due process rights such as notice, however, will be very
difficult where a contagious disease is at issue. The
MSEHPA stipulates that the public health authority may
temporarily isolate or quarantine individuals through a
written directive, but without notice by a court, if the delay
to provide notice would "significantly jeopardize" the public
health authority's ability to prevent the transmission of
contagious diseases. 244 It is difficult to imagine a scenario
240. TURNING POINT ACT, prefatory notes, at 3; See generally M. Jane Brady
et al., How States Are Using the Turning Point Model State Health Act, 32 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 97 (2004).

241. Ctr. for Law & the Pub.'s Health at Georgetown & Johns Hopkins
Univs., The Turning Point Model State Public Health Act State Legislative
Table (Oct. 24,
2006),
available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/
Resources/ResourcesPDFs/MSPHA%20LegisTrack.pdf. This State Legislative
Table does not include legislative bills closely resembling the MSEHPA,
although some of the MSEHPA's provisions are included in the TURNING POINT
ACT. Id.

242. Id.
243. MSEHPA § 102.
244. Id. § 605(a)(1).
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involving a contagious disease where there would be time to
adequately provide notice. Given that the text calls for a
threat that would "significantly" jeopardize the public
health, public health authorities may more readily exercise
their discretion in the direction of not complying with the
due process requisite of notice.
The written directive for quarantine without notice
must specify the identity of the quarantined individual(s);
the premises subject to the isolation or quarantine; the date
it will begin; and the suspected contagious disease, if
known. 245 The public health authority is required to file a
petition for a court order authorizing the continued
isolation or quarantine within ten days after issuing the
246
written directive.
The provisions set forth in the MSEHPA for isolation or
quarantine with notice provide that, where possible, the
public health authority may make a written petition to the
trial court for an order authorizing isolation or
quarantine. 247 This petition must specify all the
requirements listed above where there is no notice, but
must also include a statement of compliance with the
conditions and a statement of the basis upon which the
isolation and quarantine is justified. 248 Notice must be
given to the individuals who will be subject to the
quarantine or isolation within twenty-four hours. 249 A
hearing must be held on any petitions filed within five days
of filing, and only in extraordinary circumstances can this
be extended for up to ten days at the discretion of the
court. 250 The individual may or may not be quarantined at
this point. The date and time when the isolation and
quarantine commences is based on the individual
circumstances as set forth in the petition. 251 A court will
grant the petition and issue an order if it is shown, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that isolation or quarantine
§ 605(a)(2).
Id. § 605(a)(4).

245. Id.
246.

247. Id. § 605(b)(1).
248. Id. § 605(b)(2).
249. Id. § 605(b)(3).
250. Id. § 605(b)(4).

251. See id. § 605(b)(2).
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is reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the spread of the
contagious disease. 252 The order may authorize the
quarantine or isolation for no more than thirty days;253
however, the public health authority may seek a
continuance. 254 These extended procedural and substantive
due process safeguards are to be applauded; however,
because the procedural protections in quarantine hearings
ought to be greater than those in civil commitment
hearings, 255 the burden of proof to meet due process
demands for quarantine ought to undoubtedly be greater
than a preponderance of evidence, the lowest evidentiary
standard that applies to civil commitments. 256
The MSEHPA additionally provides that individuals
subject to quarantine or isolation may apply to the trial
court for release, somewhat akin to a writ of habeas
corpus, 257 seeking an order to show cause why the
individuals should not be released. 258 The court must rule
on the application within forty-eight hours. If granted, a
hearing must then be scheduled within twenty-four
hours. 259 Further, hearings may be requested where the
isolation and quarantine orders are breached. 260 A record of
the proceedings must be kept, and counsel is appointed at
state expense for those who are not otherwise represented
by counsel. 261 These provisions include all the due process
protections that were required by the Greene court. 262
Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have passed
bills that include these procedural due process provisions. 263

252. Id. § 605(b)(5).
253. Id. § 605(b)(5)(i).
254. Id. § 605(b)(6).
255. See supra Part II.E.
256. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
257. See Reich, supra note 236, at 412.
258. MSEHPA § 605(c)(1).
259. Id.
260. Id. § 605(c)(2).
261. Id. §§ 605(d); 605(e)(1).
262. See Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980).
263. MSEHPA Legislative Surveillance Table, supra note 239 (AK, AZ, CT,
DE, DC, GA, HI, ID, ME, MD, MN, NV, NH, NM, NC, PA, RI, SC, WY). Note
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The Turning Point Act similarly formulates separate
procedures for temporary isolation and quarantine without
notice and isolation or quarantine with notice. With slight
changes of wording and some differences in ordering,
Section 5-108[d]-[f] of the Turning Point Act adopts Section
605 of the MSEHPA outlined above, with two notable
exceptions.
The first difference relates to the timeframe for
hearings and depends on when the state files a petition
seeking a confinement order. In regard to isolation or
quarantine with notice, the MSEHPA requires that a
hearing be held within five days of filing a petition, and
within a maximum of ten days in extraordinary
circumstances and for good cause at the discretion of the
court. 264 However, the Turning Point Act requires that such
hearings be held within forty-eight hours of the filing of the
petition and up to five days in extraordinary circumstances
26 5
and for good cause at the discretion of the court.
The second difference between the two model acts
relates to the evidentiary burden in such proceedings. The
MSEHPA stipulates that "[t]he court shall grant the
petition if, by a preponderance of the evidence, isolation or
quarantine is shown to be reasonably necessary to prevent
or limit the transmission of a contagious or possibly
contagious disease to others." 266 Whereas, the Turning
Point Act stipulates that "[t]he court shall grant the
petition . . . by clear and convincing evidence. ' 267 Because
the Supreme Court decided in Texas v. Addington that the
clear and convincing evidence standard was appropriate for
civil commitment, states should consider adopting that
standard for quarantine and not the more lenient
preponderance of the evidence standard since quarantine
impinges upon the right to liberty more than involuntary
commitment for being mentally ill.268
that "this table only tracks the subject matter of recently passed legislative
bills, not existing legislative provisions." Id.
264. MSEHPA § 605(b)(4).
265. TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108[e](3).

266. MSEHPA § 605(b)(5) (emphasis added).
267. TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108[e](4) (emphasis added).
268. See supra Part ILE.
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The Turning Point Act calls for stricter procedural due
process requirements and hence offers greater protection of
individual rights. These added protections will do little to
impinge upon the authority of public health officials to
effectively enforce isolation and quarantine in the event of
an epidemic or a bioterrorism event; however, they do much
to safeguard the liberty interests of affected individuals.
Because of these differences, states would be wise to adopt
the provisions in the Turning Point Act over those in the
MSEHPA. The Turning Point Act is also superior with
respect to protecting individual liberty since it includes a
procedural due process "catchall" provision. 269 Nonetheless,
for those states that have not updated their isolation and
quarantine statutes, either model act would be a significant
step toward protecting Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests.
2. New York City Health Code Revisions. In light of
September 11, 2001, the New York City Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene ("Department") revised the city
health code to improve its ability to effectively control and
contain not only known diseases, but also novel infectious
agents. New York City's amendments come close to
anticipating a procedural due process continuum because of
the added flexibility in enforcing quarantine and the
corresponding flexibility in protecting due process rights.
Just two days before the world became aware of SARS,
the amendments were approved by the New York City
Board of Health and were implemented against SARS. 270
These amendments, which became effective July 19, 2003,
specifically attempt to ensure that health authorities can
legally quarantine individuals for previously unknown
diseases, as might be the case with bioengineered diseases
or newly emerging diseases. 271 Because there may be no
effective treatment or preventive measures, New York City
has recognized that isolation and quarantine of cases and

269. See TURNING POINT ACT § 8-103.
270. Marc Santora, Forged by Fire,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2005, § 14, at 1.
271. See 24 R.C.N.Y. HEALTH CODE REG. § 11.55 (2003).
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contacts may be the only
effective public health measures to
272
control the outbreak.
In New York City, guidelines are in place in all acute
care facilities to address the evaluation of patients with
suspected smallpox infection. 273 A diagnostic algorithm
developed by the CDC is one tool stipulated in the
guidelines. 274 Depending upon a distinct set of clinical
criteria, patients would be classified as low, moderate, or
high risk. 275 "All moderate and high risk patients would be
medically tested and evaluated immediately .... ,,276
Similar guidelines could be used to evaluate patients with
other suspected infectious diseases if sufficient clinical
criteria are known. This approach is clearly less applicable
to novel and newly emerging diseases. In those instances, it
would be impossible to say that a particular individual "is"
a present danger until the medical situation was better
determined. The Department anticipated this issue and
amended the New York City Health Code to clarify
that
277
individuals who "may be" a danger can be detained.
The City Health Commissioner may order the detention
of a "case, contact or carrier," or "suspected case, contact, or
carrier" of a communicable disease by clear and convincing
evidence. 278 In light of Addington v. Texas, clear and
convincing appears to be the proper burden of proof for
279
quarantine when an individual's liberty is at stake.
Obviously, a suspected case, contact, or carrier should be
afforded greater procedural protection than a diagnosed
case, contact or carrier.

272. N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, N.Y. CITY BD. OF
HEALTH, NOTICE OF ADOPTION OF AMENDMENTS TO SECTIONS 11.01 AND 11.55 OF
THE
NEW
YORK
CITY
HEALTH
CODE
2
(2003),
available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption.pdf.
273. Id. at 3.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See 24 R.C.N.Y. HEALTH CODE REG. § 11.55 ("Removal and detention of
cases, contacts, and carriers who are or may be a danger to public health."
(emphasis added)).
278. Id. § 11.55(a) (emphasis added).
279. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
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Individuals who are detained for less than three
business days will be afforded an opportunity to be heard
upon request and their individual circumstances would be
assessed to determine whether detention should be
continued. 280 The Commissioner's order must advise the
detained individual that he or she has the right to request
release and must include instructions on how such a
request is made. 281 If the detainment extends beyond three
days and the individual requests release, the Commissioner
must obtain a court order within three business days. 282 No
individual is to be detained for more than sixty days
without a court order, even if no request for release is
made. 283 Additionally, any person who is subject to
detention has the right to be represented by counsel and
upon request, counsel is provided. 284 These amendments
represent a marked achievement toward applying
quarantine with sufficient due process in a flexible and
adaptable manner. However, detention for up to sixty days
without a court order seems to be an excessive period of
time.
In the wake of SARS, a new subdivision was added to
the New York City Health Code providing that when an
individual is ordered to remain at home or at a premise of
the individual's choice acceptable to the Department, and
the order is not being physically enforced, the individual
must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. However, the
due process protections for custodial detention orders
described above are not applicable in these non-custodial
orders. The preference is for people to stay at home and self
quarantine, but states and localities must 285
have alternatives
that anticipate non-compliant individuals.
The procedural safeguards contained in the revisions
described above are similar to those found in section 11.47
of the New York City Health Code, which is applicable to

280. 24 R.C.N.Y. HEALTH CODE REG. § 11.55(e).
281. Id.
282. Id. § 11.55(f).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See generally David Tuller, If SARS Hits U.S., Quarantine Could Too,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at Fl.
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the compulsory detention of tuberculosis patients who do
not complete treatment. 28 6 Amendments to the provisions
dealing with tuberculosis, and the relevant procedural
protections, were enacted
in 1993 and have since been
28 7
upheld by the courts.
B. FederalProceduralDue Process Requirements: HHS
PandemicInfluenza Plan & Changes in Federal
QuarantineRegulations
On November 1, 2005, President George W. Bush
issued his National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza to
address the nation's preparedness and response to an
influenza pandemic. 288 It reflects the federal government's
approach to a pandemic threat and is based on three pillars:
(1) preparedness and communication; (2) surveillance and
detection; and (3) response and containment. 28 9 Quarantine
authority is acknowledged as an appropriate public health
intervention as part of the response and containment
pillar. 290 The following day, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services ("HHS") Secretary Michael Leavitt
released the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan ("HHS
Plan"), 291 the medical and public health component of the
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.
The HHS Plan is a detailed guide on how the health
care system in the United States can prepare and respond
to an influenza pandemic. In particular, it provides
guidance to national, state, and local policy makers and
health departments with the goal of achieving a state of
readiness and quick response. The HHS Plan includes a

286. See 24 R.C.N.Y. HEALTH CODE REG. § 11.47; N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF HEALTH

& MENTAL HYGIENE, supra note 271, at 6.
287. See City of New York v. Antoinette R., 630 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (1995); City
of New York v. Doe, 614 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1994). For more discussion of the New York
City Department of Health tuberculosis regulations, § 11.47, see Reilly, supra
note 185, at 133.
288. NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 2.

289. Id. at 3-9.
290. Id. at 8.
291. HHS PANDEMIC INFLUENZA PLAN (U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
Nov.
2005),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/pandemicflu/plan/pdfl
HHSPandemiclnfluenzaPlan.pdf [hereinafter HHS PLAN].
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checklist of legal considerations for pandemic influenza.
Notably, there is a specific section devoted to due process
considerations in the context of quarantine and isolation.
Among these considerations are the following:
"

*
*

that
legal
counsel
has
reviewed
all
draft
isolation/quarantine orders and forms, as well as
applicable administrative hearing procedures, to ensure
concurrence with basic elements of due process (e.g.,
adequate notice, opportunity to contest, administrative
determination).
that procedures or protocols exist to ensure that persons
subject to an isolation/quarantine order have access to
legal counsel, if desired.
that legal counsel has analyzed procedures needed to
process in different isolation/quarantine
satisfy due
292
scenarios.

On May 3, 2006, President Bush released the
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy to translate
and
the previous National Strategy into specific actions 293
It
responsibilities for Federal departments and agencies.
includes measures of progress and timelines for
implementation. Further, it sets expectations and provides
initial guidance for state and local governments and private
entities on the development of their institutional plans for
pandemic preparation, including the implementation of
isolation and quarantine. Due process concerns are not
addressed; rather, the intent of this implementation plan is
to provide a common frame of reference for understanding
the pandemic threat and to coordinate planning
considerations.
Of great significance, the CDC and HHS released on
November 22, 2005 a proposed rule addressing control of
communicable diseases and amending federal regulations
governing quarantine ("Proposed Rule"). 294 These are the
first significant changes to federal quarantine regulations

292. HHS PLAN § 1-14.
293. IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, supra note 2.

294. See Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (proposed
Nov. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 70-71), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dq/nprm/docs/42CFR70-71.pdf.
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in at least twenty-five years. 295 The Proposed Rule sets out
key legal rights, including appeals processes, in
extraordinary detail for those affected by isolation and
quarantine. The public comment period of sixty days
expired on January 30, 2006. The CDC will issue a final
regulation at a future date.
As a matter of routine, quarantine officers assess the
presence of disease by conducting short term examinations
296
of ill passengers at airports and other ports of entry.
Where persons are suspected of having quarantinable
diseases, 297 the Director of the CDC has historically
recommended medical isolation and/or home quarantine.
Such examinations and isolation and quarantine have
generally occurred on a voluntary basis with the
individual's consent. 298 However, the sections of the
Proposed Rule discussed below address those situations
where passengers or travelers refuse to comply on a
voluntary basis.
For those individuals believed to be in the qualifying
stage of a quarantinable disease and who are moving or
about to move from state to state, provisional quarantine is
permitted for up to three business days without an
administrative hearing, but with a provisional quarantine
order. 299 If further quarantine or isolation is necessary, the
Director of the CDC must issue a written quarantine order
including: the identity of the individuals to be quarantined;
the quarantine location; the date and time when the
quarantine will begin and end; a statement setting out
scientific principles and evidence of exposure or infection
that form the basis of the belief that the individual is in a
qualifying stage of a quarantinable disease; and a

295. See CDC Seeks to Update Quarantine Rules: Fed Officials Propose
Changes Like Easier Access to Airline Passenger Lists, MSNBC, Nov. 22, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/10155359/.
296. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,902 (to be
codified at Summary of Proposed 42 C.F.R. § 70.14).
297. Those specified in an Executive Order by the President. See supra
notes 47-49.
298. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,902, 71,903 (to
be codified at Summary of Proposed 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.14, 70.16).
299. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,932-33 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 70.14(a)-(c)).
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statement that while the quarantine order is in effect, the
individual may request a hearing to review the quarantine
order. 30 0 The person may also seek judicial review of the
quarantine order through a habeas corpus petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241.301 The length of quarantine or
isolation must not exceed the period of incubation and
communicability for the communicable
disease as
determined by the Director of the CDC. 302 This would
obviously be difficult for new diseases or new strains of
diseases where such information is not known.
If an individual subject to quarantine requests a
hearing, it must be held within one business day of the
request. 03 The Director of the CDC will designate a hearing
officer to review the factual and scientific evidence and to
make a recommendation as to whether the quarantine
should be continued or terminated. 3 4 The purpose of the
hearing is not to review any legal or constitutional issues;
rather, it is to determine if the individual is in the stage of
the disease where quarantine is necessary.
Further provisions have been included in the Proposed
Rule to ensure adherence to the basic elements of due
process. For example, the quarantined individual may
submit evidence through a representative, and measures
are to be taken that are "reasonably necessary" to allow
individuals to communicate with their representative (e.g.,
by video-conferencing, e-mail, or telephone). 30 5 Within one
business day of the hearing's conclusion, the Director of the
CDC will order either the release or the continued
quarantine of the individual on the basis of the hearing
officer's findings and written recommendation, and the

300. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,933 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 70.14(d), 70.17).
301. 28 U.S.C. 2241 (2000).
302.
codified
303.
codified
304.
codified
305.
codified

Control of Communicable
at 42 C.F.R. § 70.16(e)).
Control of Communicable
at 42 C.F.R. § 70.20(a)).
Control of Communicable
at 42 C.F.R. § 70.20(d)).
Control of Communicable
at 42 C.F.R. § 70.20 (e)-(f)).

Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,933 (to be
Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,934 (to be
Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,934 (to be
Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,934 (to be
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administrative record.30 6 There is no provision for appeal of
the hearing.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND LARGE-SCALE
QUARANTINE

What will happen if an avian flu pandemic or a
bioterrorism event occurs in the United States and a large
number of individuals become ill? What if vaccines and
treatment prove ineffective or there is an inadequate
supply, thereby making quarantine on a large scale
necessary? Such measures were necessary to a certain
extent in Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan,
and Vietnam, the countries with the greatest number of
SARS cases during the 2003 global outbreak. 30 7 The United
States was largely spared and neither individual nor
population-based8
quarantine
of
contacts
was
recommended. 30
In the event of a large-scale quarantine in the United
States, the due process protections outlined above will
almost undoubtedly survive, but realistically may not be
possible in all instances. The first step in protecting due
process rights, as previously discussed, is having statutes
and regulations, both on the federal and state level,
mandating legal safeguards. The next step is having plans
to ensure they are carried out.
One essential element of enforcement is to anticipate
how the court system will accommodate broad public health
threats. This includes considerations for extended hours for
judges or hearing officers to review isolation and
quarantine requests and orders, plans for hearing cases or
appeals for isolated or quarantined individuals where
personal appearance may be a threat to public health, and
plans for proceedings involving numerous people.

306. Control of Communicable Diseases, 70 Fed. Reg. at 71,934 (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. § 70.20(i)).
307. See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., QUARANTINE AND ISOLATION:
LESSONS LEARNED FROM SARS: A REPORT TO THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND
PREVENTION
44-116
(Nov.
2003),
available
at
www.louisville.edu/medschool/ibhpl/images/pdf/SARS%20REPORT.pdf.
308. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 5.
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A recommendation within the HHS Plan is directly on
point, providing that "[w]here applicable, ensure that public
health officials have worked with the local court system to
develop a 24 hours a day, 7 days a week 'on call' list of
judges or hearing officers to review emergency requests for
isolation/quarantine. '30 9 All localities would be wise to put
together a list of federal and state judges or hearing officers
for the purpose of quarantine emergency requests and
emergency appeals.
With the threat of an avian flu pandemic looming,
procedures to allow individuals subject to isolation and
quarantine to have meaningful participation in their
hearings or appeal without a personal appearance are
essential to protect due process and to protect court
personnel and counsel from infectious disease. The HHS
Plan includes a due process recommendation to "[e]nsure
that public health officials have worked with the local court
system to develop a plan for hearing cases and/or appeals
for persons subject to isolation/quarantine orders (e.g.,
participation via telephone, video conference). ' '310 Relevant
31 2
sections of the MSEHPA311 and the Turning Point Act
provide that in the event parties cannot personally appear
before the court, proceedings may be conducted by their
legal or authorized representative and be held in any
location or via any means that allows all parties to fully
participate.
Courts in the past have permitted representatives to
appear in lieu of sick individuals at hearings. As far back as
1909, in Kirk v. Wyman, the sick individual's physician,
rather than the patient herself, presented the patient's view
to the board of health so the contagion would not spread. 313
If an authorized representative, preferably legal counsel, is
the only alternative then it should be permitted. However,
localities are encouraged to explore other options where the
sick could individually participate in hearings or appeals by
webcasting, telephone, or video telecommunication.

309. HHS PLAN § 1-14.
310. Id.
311. See MSEHPA § 605(d).
312. See TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108[f](3).
313. See Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 390 (S.C. 1909).
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Such concerns and solutions are discussed in detail in
the Public Health Law Bench Book for Indiana Courts
("Bench Book").314 The Bench Book was created as a
significant part of the current public health emergency legal
preparedness initiative underway at the Public Health Law
Program of the CDC. More states should give thoughtful
consideration to emulating this Bench Book and a few
states already have. A bench book for Kentucky will be
published soon, and a similar effort is underway in
Arizona. 315 The bench books are a reference manual for
judges to guide them through a range of public health
issues, such as quarantine and isolation. They can be used
to quickly check the requirements of relevant statutes,
cases, and procedures during emergencies when there is
insufficient time for extensive legal research. 3 16 The judicial
bench books are ideal for judges who may be untrained in
public health and perhaps have never issued a quarantine
order, but suddenly find themselves responsible for deciding
numerous quarantine cases.
Lastly, all jurisdictions should seriously consider
having plans in place for protecting due process rights when
the proceedings involve numerous persons, as they would in
the event of a large-scale quarantine. Where there are
insufficient numbers of judges or hearing officers to hear
quarantine related hearings or appeals, numbers may be
augmented through the use of higher court judges, the
appointment of senior judges, and the appointment of
temporary judges who are attorneys residing in that
district. 317

314. AMY R. SCHOFIELD, LINDA L. CHEZEM, CTR. FOR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
P'SHIPS, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW BENCH BOOK FOR INDIANA COURTS § 5.11 (2005),

available at http://www.publichealthlaw.info/INBenchBook.pdf.
315. CDC, Judicial Officials Meet to Discuss Public Health Law Bench
Books, CDC PUB. HEALTH L. NEWS (Public Health Law Program, Atlanta, G.A.),
Mar. 8, 2006. CDC officials met the beginning of March 2006 in Atlanta with
state judges, court administrators, and judiciary executives from the U.S.
Department of Justice and ten states to discuss progress on a series of bench
books. Id. Participants at the meeting discussed methods for starting state
bench book projects, including obtaining funding, forming advisory committees,
consulting with experts, and other key actions. Id.
316. See id.
317. SCHOFIELD ET AL., supra note 314, § 5.31(A).
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Where a local board of health or health officer finds it
essential to bring a judicial action to enforce isolation or
quarantine orders against numerous individuals, it may be
necessary to consolidate cases as a class action. 318 In such
instances, class certification may be appropriate, depending
on state procedural law, since questions of law, fact, and
objections would be similar in most of the consolidated
cases. Class certification is best as a measure of last resort,
when no other procedure is feasible for efficiently
adjudicating all matters pending before the court. 319 The
MSEHPA and the Turning Point Act recommend
consolidation of individual claims where:
(i) [t]he number of individuals affected is so large as to render
individual participation impractical; (ii) [t]here are questions of
law or fact common to the individual claims or rights to be
determined; (iii) [t]he group claims or rights . . . are typical of the
affected individuals' claims or rights; and (iv) [t]he entire group
3 20
[can be adequately represented.]

In the event the court agrees to class certification, the
following ought to be required: (1) the best notice possible is
provided to all the class members, including individual
notice when reasonable; (2) each member of the class is to
be advised, through the notice, that he or she may request
to opt out of the class; and (3) the class is fully described
when the orders are issued. 321
It will take additional planning to adequately prepare
for large-scale quarantine. Nonetheless, taking into account
such considerations would be a significant step toward
protecting the procedural due process rights that are owed
to individuals in a contemporary quarantine.
CONCLUSION

It has been almost eight decades since the United
States has been faced with quarantine on a large scale, and
much in the law and science has changed. The recent

318. Id. § 5.32(A).
319.

Id. § 5.32(note).

320. TURNING POINT ACT § 5-108[f] (3); MSEHPA § 605(e)(2).
321. SCHOFIELD ETAL.,

supra note 314, § 5.32(A).
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proposed changes in federal quarantine law, which include
updated procedural safeguards, are the first in over two
decades. Additionally, numerous states have updated their
quarantine laws by adding due process provisions.
To best protect the individual's right to liberty, isolation
and quarantine regulations should be as narrowly tailored
as possible to adequately address a valid public health
necessity. Public health officials and courts should seriously
consider applying due process from a continuum
framework: the greater the restraint and less definite the
diagnosis, the greater the due process protections. This
continuum notion is consistent with both substantive and
procedural due process requirements. Such a framework
will provide flexibility to public health officials and courts
while at the same time offering the greatest amount of
safeguards possible to protect the valued individual right to
liberty. Moreover, the continuum framework recognizes the
differences
in due process
requirements
between
quarantine and isolation, which is ignored by merely
applying to both the same due process requirements for
civil commitments. The updated New York City Health
Code is exemplary in that it embraces the continuum
notion.
Due process holds an important place in the legal
history of the United States. To guarantee the right to
liberty in a contemporary quarantine, it will be crucial that
procedural safeguards are enforced and that quarantine
regulations comply with substantive due process. Those
tasks will be challenging should quarantine be on a large
scale, but adequate preparation and knowledge of due
process protections will be key.

